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Deaths Due to Use of Lethal Force by Law
Enforcement
Findings From the National Violent Death
Reporting System, 17 U.S. States, 2009–2012
Sarah DeGue, PhD,1 Katherine A. Fowler, PhD,1 Cynthia Calkins, PhD2
Introduction: Several high-proﬁle cases in the U.S. have drawn public attention to the use of lethal
force by law enforcement (LE), yet research on such fatalities is limited. Using data from a public
health surveillance system, this study examined the characteristics and circumstances of these
violent deaths to inform prevention.
Methods: All fatalities (N¼812) resulting from use of lethal force by on-duty LE from 2009 to 2012
in 17 U.S. states were examined using National Violent Death Reporting System data. Case
narratives were coded for additional incident circumstances.
Results: Victims were majority white (52%) but disproportionately black (32%) with a fatality rate
2.8 times higher among blacks than whites. Most victims were reported to be armed (83%); however,
black victims were more likely to be unarmed (14.8%) than white (9.4%) or Hispanic (5.8%) victims.
Fatality rates among military veterans/active duty service members were 1.4 times greater than
among their civilian counterparts. Four case subtypes were examined based on themes that emerged
in incident narratives: about 22% of cases were mental health related; 18% were suspected “suicide by
cop” incidents, with white victims more likely than black or Hispanic victims to die in these
circumstances; 14% involved intimate partner violence; and about 6% were unintentional deaths due
to LE action. Another 53% of cases were unclassiﬁed and did not fall into a coded subtype.
Regression analyses identiﬁed victim and incident characteristics associated with each case subtype
and unclassiﬁed cases.
Conclusions: Knowledge about circumstances of deaths due to the use of lethal force can inform the
development of prevention strategies, improve risk assessment, and modify LE response to increase
the safety of communities and ofﬁcers and prevent fatalities associated with LE intervention.
(Am J Prev Med 2016;51(5S3):S173–S187) & 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of American Journal of
Preventive Medicine. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Public attention on the use of lethal force by lawenforcement (LE), particularly within minoritycommunities, has surged in recent years following
multiple high-proﬁle cases involving the killings of
unarmed black men and youth by police.1–3 Concern
over these cases fueled nationwide protests in 2015,
including some incidents of civil unrest 4,5 and the rise
of the Black Lives Matter movement.6 Major acts of civil
disobedience and unrest have arisen throughout U.S.
history in response to concerns about police use of force,
often with long-term health and economic consequences
for affected communities.7 In addition to issues of racial
and social inequality, concerns about the risk to vulner-
able populations—including individuals with mental
illness—have also been raised.8–11
Fatalities resulting from the use of lethal force by LE
agents while on duty (referred to here and elsewhere 12,13
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as legal intervention deaths, consistent with the ICD-10
category for deaths resulting from LE action without
regard to intent or legality14) account for approximately
1% of all violent deaths in the U.S. each yeara,12,15 and 4%
of all homicides.15 However, these cases have profound
consequences that extend beyond the direct impact on
victims and their families.7 The estimated lifetime
medical costs for injuries and fatalities related to LE
action totaled $231 million in 2012.16
Recent analyses17 suggest that legal intervention
deaths increased 45% (from 0.11 to 0.16/100,000)
between 1999 and 2013, with higher rates among blacks
(0.24); American Indian/Alaska Natives (0.20); and
Hispanic whites (0.17) compared with non-Hispanic
whites (0.09) and Asian/Paciﬁc Islanders (0.05).17 An
examination of data from 1960 to 2010 also indicated
consistently higher rates among black men compared
with white men, with rate ratios ranging from 2.6 to
10.1.3 Estimates also suggest that 25% to more than 50%
of fatal encounters with LE involve individuals with
mental illness.8–11 Concerns over the use of lethal force,
including links to racial and social inequities and use
of force against mentally ill people, have resulted in calls
for increased attention to this issue within public
health.4–6,8,18 Yet, research examining the circumstances
of such cases remains limited.
The use of lethal force, in many cases, reﬂects the risks
inherent in policing and the duty to mitigate immediate
danger to the public and police personnel.19 However, there
is increasing recognition that lethal force, even when ruled
“justiﬁable” from a legal perspective, is sometimes prevent-
able.2 A 2015 report by the Police Executive Research
Forum cited missed opportunities to “ratchet down”
confrontations and called for improved conﬂict de-
escalation training and cultural shifts within policing to
emphasize tactics reducing the need for force.2 The U.S.
Department of Justice made similar recommendations
following the Ferguson Police Department investigation.1
Research suggests that organizational policies and training
can safely reduce the use of deadly force.20 Similar training
approaches have been used successfully by several LE
agencies to increase use of de-escalation strategies
in situations involving individuals with severe mental
illness, owing to long-standing community concerns about
use of force against this population.21
Two national data reporting systems collect infor-
mation on legal intervention deaths in the U.S. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform
Crime Reporting Program collects data directly from
more than 18,000 LE agencies nationwide. The
National Vital Statistics System (NVSS), operated by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
(CDC’s) National Center for Health Statistics, collects
death certiﬁcate data for all U.S. states and territories.
Prior studies suggest that both systems may under-
count these fatalities for different reasons.7 NVSS tends
to misclassify cases as homicides when information
about police involvement is not mentioned by death
certiﬁers, whereas the Uniform Crime Reporting Pro-
gram most often misses cases due to data omission or
failure to report by some jurisdictions, as participation
is voluntary.7 Media accounts suggest that the total
number of legal intervention deaths in the U.S. may be
much higher than that captured by ofﬁcial records.22
The FBI announced plans in 2015 to improve and
expand data collection on injuries and deaths resulting
from LE use of force.23
A third federal data source, CDC’s National Violent
Death Reporting System (NVDRS), is a state-based active
surveillance system of all violent deaths in participating
states,b including legal intervention deaths.24 Although
NVDRS does not currently collect data in all states and,
thus, cannot provide national estimates, the system
triangulates data from multiple sources—death certiﬁ-
cates, coroner/medical examiner reports, and LE reports
—to provide the most complete and detailed data
available for included states.25 A recent analysis25
found that NVDRS captures more than twice the number
of legal intervention death cases relative to the FBI’s
Supplemental Homicide Report and 71% more than
NVSS.
Understanding the circumstances of legal intervention
deaths is critical to informing risk assessment, training,
and policies that can eliminate preventable fatalities due
to LE action.12,17 The current study uses NVDRS data to
describe the nature and characteristics of incidents
resulting in these deaths, including data on victim and
ofﬁcer demographic characteristics, victim’s mental
health, and types of criminal activity occurring in the
incident. Racial/ethnic differences in incident charac-
teristics are also examined given prior evidence of,
and current concern in communities about, potential
inequities.3–6,17
aData from the National Vital Statistics System available through the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Web-based Injury Statistics
Query and Reporting System identiﬁed 785,875 total violent deaths from
1999 to 2013; 6,338 of these were legal intervention deaths (0.8%). National
Violent Death Reporting System data available through the Web-based
Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System identiﬁed 174,502 violent
deaths from 2003 to 2013; 1,493 of these were legal intervention
deaths (1%).
bParticipation in NVDRS is voluntary with federal funding provided through
a competitive process based on current budgetary allocations. The number of
states funded by CDCwas expanded to 32 in 2014, andwas further expanded to
42 states in 2016 (www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nvdrs).
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Methods
The National Violent Death Reporting System
NVDRS is a state-based surveillance system that links data on
violent deaths (e.g., suicide, homicide, legal intervention) from
death certiﬁcates; coroner/medical examiner reports; and LE
reports in an incident-based, conﬁdential data set.24,26 Legal
intervention deaths, as deﬁned within NVDRS, are fatalities where
the victim is killed by a LE ofﬁcer acting while on duty.c Fatalities
resulting from LE action are included without regard to whether
the death was intentional or legally justiﬁable. Data abstractors in
each participating state review investigative ﬁndings from each
data source and abstract information on incident circumstances
and characteristics of victims and ofﬁcers using standardized
coding guidance.26 NVDRS also includes two narratives generated
by the state abstractor containing a brief description of the incident
based on information from the coroner/medical examiner and LE
reports.
Case Identiﬁcation and Narrative Coding
Cases in the current study originated from statewide data for the
17 statesd participating in NVDRS during the study period. All
cases classiﬁed in NVDRS as legal intervention deaths or homi-
cides in which the perpetrator was an LE ofﬁcer were selected and
narratives were reviewed to ensure they met the NVDRS case
deﬁnition for legal intervention deaths. In addition to analysis of
existing NVDRS variables, case narratives were reviewed and
coded by the authors for an additional ten variables developed for
the current study. These included:
1. number of civilians killed by victime in the 24 hours preceding
their death;
2. number of ofﬁcers killed by victim;
3. number of other people killed by ofﬁcers in the incident;
4. whether ofﬁcers were injured (by the victim or others involved
in the incident);
5. whether the victim had a weapon (including objects used as
weapons, such as vehicles, or perceived as weapons, such as toy
guns); and
6. whether the victim posed an immediate threat (perceived or
actual) to LE or civilians (deﬁned by verbal death threats while
armed, use of a weapon against or physical assault of LE/civilian,
or physical expression of threats, such as pointing a ﬁrearm).
These also included four case subtypes suggested by prior
research 27–30 that emerged as themes during the authors’ initial
review of the narratives (Tables 1 and 2):
7. unintentional death;
8. circumstances/evidence suggesting that the victim engaged in
life-threatening or criminal behavior directed at LE to elicit use
of lethal force (referred to here and in other research 30–35 as
“suicide by cop”);
9. police contact/incident directly related to concerns about the
victim’s current psychological functioning; and
10. LE contact or legal intervention involved intimate partner
violence (IPV).
All narrative coding was completed by the authors. A randomly
selected sample of 75 cases (9.3%) were coded in pairs. Inter-rater
agreement ranged from 87.8% to 100% (κ range, 0.70–1.0); all
discrepancies were discussed and coded to consensus. The remaining
cases were coded independently with group discussion as needed.
Descriptive analyses were conducted to examine characteristics
of the incidents, victims, and involved ofﬁcers. Bridged-race
population data and American Community Survey data from
the U.S. Census Bureau were used to calculate crude rates per
100,000. All reported rates represent annualized averages across
the 4 data years (2009–2012). Differences in incident character-
istics by race/ethnicity were examined using chi-square analyses
with post hoc pairwise comparisons of signiﬁcant results. Logistic
regression analyses were also used to further examine victim and
incident characteristics associated with each coded case subtype
and unclassiﬁed cases.
Results
There were 812 legal intervention deaths identiﬁed by
NVDRS in 17 participating states from 2009 to 2012.
Characteristics and circumstances of these cases are
presented in Tables 3–6.
The vast majority (93.6%) of fatal injuries were inﬂicted
by ﬁrearms. Incidents occurred most often in a home
(44.6%) or on a public street/sidewalk (22.4%), with about
one third of fatal injuries occurring in the victim’s own
residence. Most injuries occurred in the evening (43.2%) or
afternoon (34.5%) hours. Fatal injuries of individuals
currently in public custody (e.g., under arrest, incarcerated,
hospitalized) were not common (6.3%). In 82.6% of cases,
the victim was reportedly armed (or assumed armed, e.g.,
unloaded/toy ﬁrearm) with a deadly weapon. In 87.7% of
cases, there was evidence of an immediate threat (perceived
or actual) posed by the victim toward LE or civilians. LE
ofﬁcers were injured or killed in 9% and 1.7% of incidents,
respectively. Incidents in which the victim killed another
civilian during the incident (5%) or with multiple legal
intervention deaths in the same incident (2.1%) were
uncommon.
Contact with LE was typically precipitated by alleged/
suspected criminal activity (80.5%), with police respond-
ing to an assault, homicide, or other violent crime in
more than half of these cases. About 11% of these cases
involved only a non-speciﬁed (“other”) crime. An
additional 19.5% were not precipitated by any known
criminal behavior. To further examine the circumstances
precipitating LE contact in these cases, the “other crime”
cIncludes other peace ofﬁcers (including military police) and excludes
legal executions.
dData were available for Alaska; Colorado; Georgia; Kentucky; Maryland;
Massachusetts; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Oregon;
Rhode Island; South Carolina; Utah; Virginia; Wisconsin (2009–2012); and
Ohio (2011–2012 only).
eThe decedent of the legal intervention death.
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case narratives and narratives of cases with no precipitat-
ing crime that were also not classiﬁed as belong-
ing to any other subtype were examined in supplemental
analyses and coded using an adapted version of a coding
scheme developed by Gill and Pasquale-Styles.34 This addi-
tional review revealed that the reason for LE presence (based
on 143 cases with sufﬁcient information) involved respond-
ing to calls for domestic disturbance (11%), brandishing a
weapon in public (7%), or shots ﬁred (9%); trafﬁc stop
(20%); serving an arrest warrant (14%); responding to a
crime (other than NVDRS categories, e.g., kidnapping,
vandalism, taking hostages; 14%); encounter during routine
patrol (6%); a well-being check (2%); undercover surveil-
lance (1%), or other/unknown reasons (16%).
Victims were predominantly male (96.1%) with a
mean age of 36.7 years. Although a majority were white,
black victims were over-represented (32.4%) relative to
the U.S. population.f36 Blacks had 2.8 times the rate of
legal intervention death compared with whites; rates
among whites and Hispanics were similar. Most victims
were U.S. born (92.1%). Unmarried/separated individu-
als had rates 2.9 times greater than those currently
married, and rates among military veterans/active duty
service members were 1.4 times the rates of their civilian
counterparts. A small percentage (1.7%) were known to
be currently homeless.
Looking at the data on ofﬁcers who used lethal force,
82% of cases had data on the sex of the ofﬁcer, whereas
Table 2. Victim Mental Health History in Mental Health/
Substance Abuse–Related Cases Only: NVDRS, 17 U.S.
States, 2009–2012
Victim MH historya (N¼176) n (%)
Ever treated for MH problem 76 (43.2)
Current treatment for MH problem 59 (33.5)
Current MH problem 83 (47.2)
Current alcohol dependence/problem 40 (22.7)
Current drug abuse problem 47 (26.7)
Psychiatric diagnosis
Depressive disorder 24 (13.6)
Schizophrenia 25 (14.2)
Bipolar disorder 18 (10.2)
PTSD 10 (5.6)
Anxiety disorder 9 (5.1)
Other 6 (3.4)
aVictim MH history only described for cases identiﬁed as related to
mental health or substance-induced disruptive behaviors; ﬁndings
reﬂect only information known to law enforcement based on witness
(e.g., family) interviews and may be underestimates.
MH, mental health; NVDRS, National Violent Death Reporting System;
PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder.
Table 1. Selected Case Subtypes Coded From Case Narratives: NVDRS, 17 U.S. States, 2009–2012
Case subtypea (N¼812) n (%) Summary of case deﬁnition
Unintentional (total)
Fatal injury while in custody
Fatal injury from capture/restraint
Accidental death while ﬂeeing
Innocent bystander
50 (6.2)
17 (2.1)
16 (2.0)
12 (1.5)
5 (0.6)
Death occurred as a result of (a) injuries sustained while in custody, (b) LE use of
force to restrain/capture, (c) accidental injury/death while the victim was ﬂeeing
crime scene or arrest, or (d) victim was an innocent bystander killed by LE.
Fatalities resulting from use of force were not intentional.
“Suicide by cop” 145 (17.9) Evidence from witness/LE accounts suggests that victim was actively suicidal and
engaged in life-threatening or criminal behavior directed at LE to elicit use of lethal
force. Evidence of suicidal intent could include: suicidal behavior/threats during
incident, suicide note, prior expression of intent/desire to be killed by LE reported
by an informant, taunting/asking LE to kill them during the incident.
IPV-related 113 (13.9) LE contact was initiated as a result of IPV complaints or IPV occurred during the
incident (e.g., threats toward/assault of partner on scene).
Mental health or substance-induced
disruptive behaviors (total)
Mental illness–related
Substance-induced
176 (21.7)
120 (14.7)
56 (6.9)
Incident was directly related to concerns about victim’s mental health or
substance-induced disruptive behaviors, including cases in which LE contact was
initiated as a result of mental health concerns about the victim or in which
evidence suggested that mental illness accounted for the victim’s behavior and/or
the circumstances that resulted in use of force. When dangerous or erratic
behavior was attributed primarily to substance use rather than mental illness,
cases were identiﬁed as substance-induced.
aCoded based on information provided in case narratives; categories are not mutually exclusive.
IPV, intimate partner violence; LE, law enforcement; MH, mental health; NVDRS, National Violent Death Reporting System; PTSD, post-traumatic stress
disorder.
fThe 2010 U.S. population was 13% black and 72% white. Supplemental
analyses of 2010 Census data indicated that the combined population of the
17 states included in this study was 15% black and 74% white, thus not
substantially different from the total U.S. population.
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only 34% had data on race/ethnicity and 23% had data on
age of the ofﬁcer. The results that follow are based on the
data that were available. Ofﬁcers were predominantly
male (97.4%) with a mean age of 35.6 years. About 12%
of LE ofﬁcers in the U.S. are women; thus, male ofﬁcers
were over-represented.37 The mean number of ofﬁcers
involved (i.e., suspected of inﬂicting the fatal injuries) per
incident was 1.3. In most cases, at least one involved
ofﬁcer was white (84.3%), with fewer cases involving
a black ofﬁcer (13.6%) or an ofﬁcer of another
race/ethnicity. Very few cases (1.6%) involved ofﬁcers
that were working in private security rather than
public LE.
Four case subtypes were coded based on a review of
incident narratives (Tables 1 and 2). To further examine
victim and incident characteristics associated with
each case subtype, logistic regression analyses were run
predicting subtype membership (Table 7). Fifty legal
intervention fatalities (6.2%) were identiﬁed as uninten-
tional with injuries occurring while in custody, during
capture/restraint, while ﬂeeing, or involving an innocent
bystander. Unintentional cases were signiﬁcantly less
likely than other cases to involve a threat to LE, an
armed victim, or evidence of alcohol use by the victim.
Another 17.9% of cases were identiﬁed as potential
“suicide by cop” incidents based on evidence (e.g.,
suicidal behavior/threats during incident, suicide note,
prior expression of intent/desire to be killed by LE
reported by an informant, taunting/asking LE to kill
them during the incident) that the victim was suicidal
and engaged in behavior to elicit the use of lethal force.
“Suicide by cop” cases were signiﬁcantly more likely than
other cases to occur in a home rather than in public,
involve victim alcohol intoxication, involve a white than
black victim, and almost eight times more likely to
involve an armed victim. IPV-related incidents, in which
ofﬁcers responded to an IPV complaint or a partner was
threatened/assaulted during the event, accounted for
13.9% of cases. IPV-related cases were 3.8 times more
likely to occur in a home and 2.8 times more likely to
involve a threat to a civilian. In 21.7% of fatalities, there
was evidence that the victim’s mental/behavioral health,
including behavior attributed to mental illness or sub-
stance use, was directly related to LE contact or use of
force. Cases related to the victim’s mental/behavioral
health were signiﬁcantly more likely to occur in a home,
less likely to be precipitated by an alleged crime, less
likely to involve injuries to LE ofﬁcers, less likely to
involve civilians killed by the victim before or during the
incident, and less likely to involve a black than white
victim. Additional information regarding the mental
health/substance abuse history of these victims is
included in Tables 1 and 2 but is limited by the
Table 3. Characteristics/Circumstances of Deaths Due to
Use of Lethal Force in 17 NVDRS States, 2009–2012
(N¼812 casesa)
Incident characteristics/Circumstances n (%)b
Autopsy performed 797 (98.2)
Primary cause of fatal injury
Firearm 760 (93.6)
Motor vehicle 11 (1.4)
Personal weapons (e.g., ﬁst) 10 (1.2)
Blunt/sharp instrument 9 (1.1)
Suffocation/strangulation 3 (0.4)
Fall 2 (0.3)
Other/unknown 16 (2.0)
No. of bullet woundsc (n¼625), median
(IQR, range)
2 (3, 1–40)
Location type of fatal injury
Home/dwelling 362 (44.6)
Street/sidewalk 182 (22.4)
Motor vehicle 51 (6.3)
Parking lot/garage 47 (5.8)
Natural area (e.g., ﬁeld, beach) 33 (4.1)
Other commercial establishment (e.g., store) 28 (3.4)
Highway/freeway 18 (2.2)
Bar/nightclub 11 (1.4)
Hospital/medical facility 10 (1.2)
Hotel/motel 9 (1.1)
Jail/prison/detention facility 7 (0.9)
Sports/athletic area 6 (0.7)
Other/unknown 48 (5.9)
Victim injured at own residence 263 (32.4)
Victim in LE custody when injured
Not in custody 433 (53.3)
Injured prior to arrest 314 (38.7)
Jail/prison 34 (4.2)
Under arrest but not in jail 13 (1.6)
Other (e.g., state institution, house arrest) 4 (.5)
Unknown 14 (1.7)
Time of day when injury occurred (n¼679)
Morning (4AM–11:59AM) 152 (22.4)
Afternoon (12NOON–7:59PM) 234 (34.5)
(continued on next page)
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information available to investigators. Forty-seven per-
cent of cases fell into one of these subtypes. Unclassiﬁed
cases (53%) were more likely to occur in public than in a
home and less likely to involve victim alcohol intoxica-
tion; they were also three times more likely to involve
injuries to law enforcement and an armed victim and
2.6 times more likely to involve a black than white
victim. As noted above, these subtype groups were
not mutually exclusive or exhaustive; other case types
may exist that were not identiﬁed and coded in this study.
For example, of those cases identiﬁed as potential
“suicide by cop” incidents, more than half (55%),
but not all, were also identiﬁed as mental/behavioral
health related.
Given racial disparities in victimization identiﬁed in
the full sample, additional analyses were conducted to
examine differences in selected incident characteristics
by race for cases involving white, black, and Hispanic
victimsg (Table 8). Black victims were signiﬁcantly
more likely to be unarmed than white or Hispanic
victims. Black victims were also signiﬁcantly less likely
than whites to have posed an immediate threat to LE.
White victims were signiﬁcantly more likely than
black victims to be killed in incidents related to
mental health or substance-induced disruptive behav-
iors and more likely than black or Hispanic victims to
be involved in potential “suicide by cop” incidents.
Hispanic victims were also more likely than black
victims to be involved in a potential “suicide by cop”
incident. Incidents involving black and Hispanic
victims were more likely than those involving white
victims to have at least one black LE ofﬁcer involved
in the fatal injury.
Discussion
Use of lethal force by LE is an issue of urgent concern to
those with a shared interest in protecting all communities
while eliminating preventable fatalities. Previous research
Table 3. Characteristics/Circumstances of Deaths Due to
Use of Lethal Force in 17 NVDRS States, 2009–2012
(N¼812 casesa) (continued)
Incident characteristics/Circumstances n (%)b
Evening (8PM–3:59AM) 293 (43.2)
Time of year when injury occurred
Spring (March–May) 215 (26.9)
Summer (June–August) 209 (26.2)
Fall (September–November) 184 (23)
Winter (December–February) 191 (23.9)
Precipitated by alleged/suspected crimed
Any precipitating crime 654 (80.5)
Assault/homicide 417 (51.3)
Other violent 98 (12.1)
Property, non-violent 85 (10.5)
Drug trade 18 (2.2)
“Other” crime(s) only 90 (11.1)
No precipitating crime speciﬁed/unknown 158 (19.5)
Circumstances coded from case narratives
Victim reportedly armed with deadly weapone
Victim armed 671 (82.6)
Victim unarmed 90 (11.1)
Unknown/not enough information 51 (6.3)
Immediate threat posed to LE or civiliansf
Threat to LEO only 547 (67.4)
Threat to civilians only 47 (5.8)
Threat to LEO and civilians 118 (14.5)
No evidence of immediate threat posed 44 (5.4)
Unknown/not enough information 56 (6.9)
Any LEO injured during incident 73 (9.0)
Any LEO killed during incident 14 (1.7)
Any civilians killed by the victim during/
preceding incidentg
43 (5.3)
Any other victims killed by LEO during same
incident
17 (2.1)
Note: Deaths due to the use of lethal force are also referred to as legal
intervention deaths, consistent with the ICD-10 category for deaths
resulting from law enforcement action without regard to intent or legality.
aExcept where subsample with available data noted in parentheses.
bValues other than n (%) are indicated as applicable.
cAmong those fatally injured by ﬁrearms with available data on bullet
wounds.
dNot mutually exclusive; could be precipitated by more than one crime.
Some NVDRS crime categories were collapsed; for example, “Other
Violent” includes all types of violent crime (e.g., robbery, rape) coded by
NVDRS other than assault and homicide.
eVictim was reportedly in possession of a potentially deadly weapon,
including objects being actively used as a weapon (e.g., vehicle) and
apparent weapons later determined to be fake or unloaded.
fVictim was reported to pose an immediate (perceived or actual)
threat/danger to law enforcement and/or civilians as indicated by
verbal threats to harm while armed, use of weapon, physical assault,
hostage-taking, physical expression of intent to harm (e.g., pointing
ﬁrearm).
gCivilians killed by victim in the same incident (withino24 hours) prior
to the fatal injury due to legal intervention.
NVDRS, National Violent Death Reporting System; IPV, intimate partner
violence; IQR, interquartile range; LE, law enforcement; LEO, Law
enforcement ofﬁcer(s).
gOther racial/ethnic groups were excluded from these analyses owing to
small sample sizes.
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using public health surveillance data has reported on
demographic trends in3,12,16,17 and speciﬁc subtypes
of32,38 legal intervention deaths. This study is the ﬁrst
to broadly examine the characteristics and detailed
circumstances of fatalities resulting from the use of
lethal force by LE using data from a multistate public
health surveillance system. These data are critical to
informing strategies to prevent these deaths and improve
public health and safety for all people. Several key
ﬁndings with implications for prevention are high-
lighted below.
The Role of Mental Illness and Suicide in Deaths
Due to the Use of Lethal Force
Agencies of LE frequently serve as ﬁrst-line responders to
mental health emergencies, including crises involving
violence.28,39 Ofﬁcers in a study of three U.S. cities
reported responding to an average of 6.4 calls/month
involving mental health crises.40 About 20% of people
hospitalized for severe mental illness, in another study,
had been arrested or picked up by police for a suspected
crime in the prior 4-month period.29 Indeed, two decades
of research have documented high rates of LE contact,
arrest, and incarceration rates for individuals with mental
illness.41–44 Ofﬁcers often report feeling inadequately
trained to assess and respond effectively as gatekeepers
for both the criminal justice and mental health systems,
and community leaders have raised concerns for many
Table 4. Victim Characteristics of Deaths Due to Use of
Lethal Force in 17 NVDRS States, 2009–2012
(N¼812 cases)
Victim characteristics n (%)
Rate per
100,000a
Rate
ratiob
Sex
Male 780 (96.1) 0.4
Female 32 (3.9) —c
Age (M 36.7, range 13–86)
0–14 1 —c
15–24 180 0.4
25–34 223 0.5
35–44 179 0.4
45–54 132 0.3
55–64 67 0.2
Z65 30 0.1
Race/ethnicityd
White (ref) 424 (52.2) 0.2
Black 263 (32.4) 0.5 2.8
Hispanic 86 (10.6) 0.2 1.1
American Indian/Alaska
native
11 (1.4) —c
Asian/Paciﬁc Islander 5 (0.6) —c
Multiracial 21 (2.6) —c
Unknown 2 (0.2) —c
Nativity
Born in U.S. (ref) 748 (92.1) 0.2
Foreign-born 64 (7.9) —c
Marital status
Married (ref) 200 (24.6) 0.1
Unmarried/separated 593 (73) 0.4 2.9
Never married 410 (50.5)
Divorced 156 (19.2)
Widowed 14 (1.7)
Separated 7 (0.9)
Single, not otherwise
speciﬁed
6 (0.8)
Unknown 19 (2.4)
Military servicee
No military service (ref) 723 (89.1) 0.2
Veteran/active duty 89 (10.9) 0.4 1.4
Currently homeless 14 (1.7) —f —f
aRates reported are crude rates per 100,000 averaged across the 4
data years (2009–2012).
bRate ratios for marital status, military service, and nativity were
calculated using population data (for the included states and years)
from the American Community Survey (ACS) (http://factﬁnder.census.
gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/programs.xhtml?program=acs). Population
data for race/ethnicity calculations were obtained from WISQARS
and rely on estimates produced for NCHS by the U.S. Census Bureau
(www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/fatal_help/data_sources.html). Rates
were calculated for each year of data (2009–2012), and rates were
averaged to create an annualized average rate. Ohio data/rates were
included only for years 2011–2012. Because of at least one cell size
o20, rates for Hispanics in 2009 and military service in 2011 were not
included in the overall average rates. Rate ratios not calculated for age
because of a lack of a logical reference group.
cRates are considered unstable for counts under 20 and are not
reported.
dData on race and ethnicity were collapsed to create a single variable.
Non-Hispanic victims/ofﬁcers with a known race were categorized by
race. Hispanic victims/ofﬁcers, regardless of race, were categorized as
Hispanic. Victims/ofﬁcers with known race but unknown ethnicity were
categorized by race only.
eDenominator data for veteran and active duty military rates comes from
the ACS and non-military population numbers were calculated by
subtracting veteran counts from civilian counts in ACS employment data.
fPopulation data unavailable; rates cannot be calculated.
NCHS, National Center for Health Statistics; NVDRS, National Violent
Death Reporting System; WISQARS, Web-based Injury Statistics Query
and Reporting System.
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years about the safety of citizens with mental health crises
who often encounter, and rely on, LE.8,28,45,46
The ﬁndings indicate that one in ﬁve (21.7%) legal
intervention deaths were directly related to issues with
the victim’s mental health or substance-induced disrup-
tive behaviors. These include incidents in which LE
contact was initiated in response to a call from someone
concerned about the victim’s safety or behavior due to
mental illness or situations in which dangerous/erratic
behavior by the victim during a police encounter was
attributed to mental illness or acute substance use.
Although individuals with mental illness are far more
likely to be victims of violent crime than perpetrators,47,48
severe behavioral or cognitive impairment might increase
the risk for escalation and use of force in some interactions
with police.21
Related incidents in which the victim engaged in life-
threatening or criminal behavior to provoke the use of
lethal force by police—widely referred to as “suicide by
cop”—have also been recognized by LE and criminal
justice researchers for several decades as a unique
challenge.32 In the current study, 17.9% of fatalities due
to the use of force were identiﬁed as potential “suicide
by cop” incidents,h a number within range of prior
estimates.30,32
Among those who died by legal intervention, this
study found that the percentage of incidents involving
mental health or substance-induced disruptive behaviors
was three times higher for whites than blacks, and that
the percentage of “suicide by cop” cases was almost seven
times higher for whites than blacks (and almost twice as
high as that of Hispanics). These ﬁndings may reﬂect, in
part, signiﬁcantly higher rates of suicide among white
men nationally.49,50 Whites may also be more likely to
contact police seeking help for themselves or a family
member in crisis owing to racial differences in trust and
perceptions of police.51
Incidents Involving Intimate Partner Violence
Long-held concerns within LE that IPV situations are
among the most dangerous for ofﬁcers generally have not
been well supported by research.27,52,53 A study of police
calls found that domestic disturbance calls ranked fourth
and ﬁfth in the ratio of calls to assaults and injuries of
ofﬁcers, respectively.54 The current study found that
13.9% of legal intervention fatalities (about one in seven)
were IPV-related, paralleling estimates of the proportion
of ofﬁcers killed on duty (14%) related to an IPV
incident.27 Although IPV is not a prevalent risk
Table 5. Victim Toxicology Results for Deaths Due to Use of
Lethal Force in 17 NVDRS States, 2009–2012 (N¼812
Cases)
Victim toxicology results
Tested,
n (%)
Positive,
n (% of tested)
Alcohol 675 (83.1) 284 (42.1)
Marijuana 432 (53.2) 124 (28.7)
Opiates 575 (70.8) 98 (17.0)
Cocaine 589 (72.5) 70 (11.9)
Amphetamines 540 (66.5) 72 (13.3)
Antidepressants 413 (50.8) 57 (13.8)
NVDRS, National Violent Death Reporting System.
Table 6. Ofﬁcer Characteristics of Deaths Due to Use of
Lethal Force in 17 NVDRS States, 2009–2012 (N¼812
Casesa)
Ofﬁcer characteristicsb n (%)c
Sex, male (n¼685 ofﬁcers with
known sex)
667 (97.4)
Age (n¼189 ofﬁcers with age
reported), M (SD, range)
35.6 (7.9, 22–61)
Race/ethnicity, when known (n¼273
incidents)d
Any white 230 (84.3)
Any black 37 (13.6)
Any Hispanic 11 (4)
Any American Indian/Alaska native 1 (0.4)
Any Asian/Paciﬁc Islander 3 (1.1)
Any multiracial 2 (0.7)
No. of ofﬁcers involved in injury,
median (IQR, range)
1 (1, 1–5)
Ofﬁcer(s) were security guards 13 (1.6)
aExcept where subsample with available data noted in parentheses.
bIncludes only ofﬁcers suspected of inﬂicting the fatal injury; does not
include other ofﬁcers on scene. Demographic/descriptive data can be
entered for up to 3 ofﬁcers per incident in NVDRS; three cases in the
current sample involved43 ofﬁcers meeting this criterion and do not
have data for those additional ofﬁcers. Because of substantial missing
data for ofﬁcer characteristics, the number of cases with available data
(n) is noted in parentheses; data were missing for the remaining cases.
cValues other than n (%) are indicated as applicable.
dData on race and ethnicity were collapsed to create a single variable.
Non-Hispanic victims/ofﬁcers with a known race were categorized by
race. Hispanic victims/ofﬁcers, regardless of race, were categorized as
Hispanic. Ofﬁcers with known race but unknown ethnicity were
categorized by race only; n ¼ number of incidents in which at least
one ofﬁcer was identiﬁed in the racial/ethnic group. Some incidents
involved ofﬁcers of more than one racial/ethnic group; thus, numbers
do not sum to 273 incidents. In most cases (539/812), ofﬁcer race/
ethnicity was not reported in NVDRS.
NVDRS, National Violent Death Reporting System.
hAs noted elsewhere, cases involving mental health or substance-induced
disruptive behaviors health concerns and “suicide by cop” were not
mutually exclusive.
DeGue et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;51(5S3):S173–S187S180
www.ajpmonline.org
Table 7. Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Case Subtypea by Victim and Incident Characteristics
Unintentional n¼50
“Suicide by cop”
n¼145 IPV-related n¼113 MH-related n¼176 Unclassiﬁedc n¼431
Characteristicb (yes/no, unless noted) β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR β (SE) OR
Fatal injury occurred in a home (ref¼public
location)
–0.96 (0.54) 0.38 0.62** (0.22) 1.20 1.33** (0.26) 3.78 0.66** (0.21) 1.93 –1.13** (0.18) 0.32
Precipitated by any alleged/suspected
crime
–0.75 (0.54) 0.47 –0.22 (0.28) 0.81 0.47 (0.36) 1.59 –0.52* (0.25) 0.60 0.22 (0.24) 1.24
Victim in LE custody when injured 1.21 (0.84) 3.34 0.23 (0.53) 1.26 0.44 (0.60) 1.55 –0.07 (0.50) 0.93 –0.55 (0.44) 0.58
Immediate threat posed to LE –1.60** (0.53) 0.20 0.18 (0.54) 1.20 0.56 (0.48) 1.75 –0.43 (0.36) 0.65 0.59 (0.33) 1.81
Immediate threat posed to civilians –0.09 (0.74) 0.91 –0.48 (0.30) 0.62 1.01** (0.27) 2.75 0.33 (0.26) 1.39 –0.12 (0.23) 0.89
Any LEO injured during incident —d —d –0.70 (0.42) 0.50 –0.06 (0.39) 0.94 –1.35** (0.49) 0.26 1.12** (0.33) 3.06
Any civilians killed by the victim 0.05 (1.29) 1.05 –0.58 (0.65) 0.56 0.45 (0.44) 1.57 –1.91* (0.77) 0.15 0.38 (0.41) 1.46
Victim reportedly armed with deadly weapon –3.62** (0.53) 0.03 2.06** (0.76) 7.88 0.67 (0.56) 1.95 –0.50 (0.34) 0.61 1.16** (0.33) 3.20
Victim race/ethnicity (ref¼white victim)
Black victim –0.89 (0.53) 0.41 –1.82** (0.35) 0.16 0.18 (0.28) 1.20 –1.32** (0.27) 0.27 0.95** (0.20) 2.58
Hispanic victim 0.11 (0.81) 1.12 –0.48 (0.35) 0.62 0.04 (0.42) 1.05 –0.31 (0.32) 0.74 0.34 (0.29) 1.41
Alcohol toxicology, positive (ref¼untested/
negative)
–1.23* (0.65) 0.29 0.50* (0.22) 1.65 0.43 (0.24) 1.53 0.32 (0.21) 1.38 –0.39* (0.18) 0.68
χ2(df) 152.93** (10,802) 97.94** (11,801) 59.32** (11,801) 82.56** (11,801) 118.74** (11,801)
Note: Boldface indicates ORs with signiﬁcant p-values (*po0.05; **po0.001).
aDependent variable for each regression model is dichotomous; all cases meeting that subtype deﬁnition versus all other cases. Subtypes are not mutually exclusive.
bIncluded variables had low levels of missing data (range ¼ 0%–7.6%).
cUnclassiﬁed cases include those cases that were not classiﬁed into any of the four selected case subtypes coded from incident narratives.
dVariable excluded from the model because of insufﬁcient variance (i.e., no ofﬁcers were injured in cases classiﬁed as unintentional).
IPV, intimate partner violence; LE, law enforcement; LEO, law enforcement ofﬁcer(s); MH, mental health.
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circumstance for lethal force incidents, speciﬁc
approaches to conﬂict de-escalation in these situations
may reduce risks to both IPV perpetrators and ofﬁcers.
Racial Inequities in Deaths Due to the Use of Lethal
Force
Recent public discourse has focused on racial disparities
in legal intervention deaths. The current study found
that, consistent with prior research,3,12,16,17,55 black
victims were substantially over-represented relative to
the U.S. population, comprising 34% of victims but only
13% of Americans,36,56 and with legal intervention death
rates 2.8 times higher than those among whites. Black
victims were also more likely to be unarmed than whites
or Hispanics, and less likely than whites to have evidence
suggesting an immediate threat to LE. Incidents
Table 8. Incident Characteristics of Deaths Due to the Use of Lethal Force by Victim Race/Ethnicity: NVDRS, 17 U.S. States,
2009–2012
n (%)d
Incident characteristics White Black Hispanic χ2
Subsample 424 (52.2) 263 (32.4) 86 (10.6)
Unarmed victim 40 (9.4)a 39 (14.8)b 5 (5.8)a 8.5*
Threat to law enforcement 362 (85.4)a 199 (75.6)b 74 (86.1) 8.3*
Threat to civilians 81 (19.1) 55 (20.1) 19 (22.1) 0.7
Any LEO injured during incident 33 (7.8) 32 (12.2) 5 (5.8) 5.0
Any LEO killed during incident 7 (1.6) 4 (1.6) 1 (1.2) —f
Any other victims killed by LEO during same incident 6 (1.4) 6 (2.3) 3 (3.5) —f
Any civilians killed by the victim during/preceding incident 21 (5.0) 22 (8.4) 3 (3.5) —f
Precipitated by alleged/suspected crime 13.3
Assault/homicide 161 (38) 97 (36.9) 35 (40.7)
Other violent 33 (7.8) 39 (14.8) 9 (10.5)
Property, non-violent 38 (9) 21 (8) 7 (8.1)
Drug trade 3 (0.7) 2 (0.8) 1 (1.2)
Other crime 91 (21.5) 40 (15.2) 19 (22.1)
No precipitating crime speciﬁed 98 (23.1) 64 (24.3) 15 (17.4)
Selected case subtypes
Mental health/substance abuse–related 127 (29.9)a 26 (9.9)b 16 (18.6) 38.2**
“Suicide by cop” 115 (27.1)a 11 (4.2)b 14 (16.3)c 58.3**
IPV-related 67 (15.8) 29 (11) 11 (12.8) 2.9
Unintentional, any type 24 (5.7) 16 (6.1) 5 (5.8) 0.09
Ofﬁcer race/ethnicity, when known (n¼273 incidents)e
Any white 124 (29.2) 68 (26.1) 28 (32.6) 1.7
Any black 7 (1.6)a 24 (9.1)b 5 (5.8)c 20.7**
Any Hispanic 7 (1.7) 2 (0.8) 1 (1.1) —f
Note: Boldface indicates signiﬁcant p-values (*po0.05; **po0.001). Tables 1–6 provide additional information regarding the variables included in
these analyses. Deaths due to the use of lethal force by law enforcement are also referred to as legal intervention deaths, consistent with the ICD-10
category for deaths resulting from law enforcement action without regard to intent or legality.
a-cDifferent superscripts in race/ethnicity columns indicate signiﬁcant differences (po0.05) in post hoc pairwise comparisons completed following
signiﬁcant omnibus chi-square tests.
dN=773; excludes 39 cases in which the victim had another or unknown race/ethnicity.
eOfﬁcer race/ethnicity data were available for 32% of white victims, 35% of black victims, and 39% of Hispanic victims.
fPearson chi-square test could not be calculated because of Z1 expected cell sizes under n=5.
IPV, intimate partner violence; LEO, law enforcement ofﬁcer; NVDRS, National Violent Death Reporting System.
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involving black and Hispanic victims were more likely to
involve at least one black LE ofﬁcer, potentially because
of greater racial diversity in police departments located in
areas with larger minority populations.
It has been suggested elsewhere 12,16 that higher rates
of deaths due to lethal force against blacks may be
accounted for by differences in the frequency of police
contact. Recent national data identiﬁed few differences
between blacks and whites in the frequency of most
forms of police contact, including requests for police
assistance, reporting of crime or neighborhood distur-
bances, and involuntary street stops.57,58 However, data
from the U.S. Department of Justice 57,58 found that black
and Hispanic drivers were more likely than whites to be
pulled over and searched or ticketed during a trafﬁc stop.
Blacks also experience disproportionately higher rates of
arrest than whites; in 2011, 69.2% of all arrested
individuals in the U.S. were white and 28.4% were
black.59 Further, although force was employed in fewer
than 4% of contacts for all racial/ethnic groups in 2008,
blacks were nearly three times more likely than whites to
experience any use of force during an LE encounter.60
Similarly, a recent study 16 using FBI arrest and NVSS
injury data found higher arrest/stop rates and higher
rates of legal intervention deaths among blacks than
whites. However, the authors found no differences in
rates of injury or death per 10,000 stops/arrests by race—
that is, blacks and whites were equally likely to be injured
or killed during a stop/arrest incident. These ﬁndings—
from one study—suggest that disparities in fatality rates
by race may be accounted for, in part, by differential rates
of police contact through stops or arrests.16 More
research is needed to examine this important research
question with clear implications for policy and practice.
Racial inequities in legal intervention fatalities may
reﬂect differences in the way that some LE ofﬁcers or
agencies perceive and interact with black community
members and suspects.12,61 Studies have shown that most
people hold culturally derived “implicit biases”—auto-
matic, unconscious stereotypes that favor some groups
and disfavor others.62 Research on implicit race bias in the
U.S. consistently demonstrates a tendency to associate
more-favorable concepts with whites and less-favorable
concepts with blacks across racial/ethnic groups, although
these biases are less common among blacks.62 These biases
can impact behavior, even among trained professionals
such as physicians.63 Among LE, such biases may be
further shaped by the nature of experiences on the job.64,65
For example, based in social-psychological theory, Smith
et al.64 argue that disproportionate contact with minority
offenders in some communities may lead ofﬁcers to
overestimate the prevalence of negative behaviors among
minority group members. Relatedly, studies of “shooter
bias” have found that both civilians and LE ofﬁcers
showed a greater tendency to shoot unarmed black men
than white men in computer simulations.66–68 Notably, in
one study, ofﬁcers were able to substantially reduce
shooter bias with repeated practice.67 Social-psycho-
logical factors are only one piece of a more complex
causal web accounting for racial inequalities in use of force
by police. Holmes and Smith 65 posit that ordinary social-
psychological processes, like ingroup–outgroup biases,
social norms, and stereotyping, may interact with charac-
teristics of neighborhoods and individuals to result in a
disproportionate use of force by LE against minorities.
More research is needed to translate theory and a growing
knowledge base into opportunities for prevention.
Eliminating Preventable Deaths Due to the Use of
Lethal Force
The need for effective strategies to reduce preventable
legal intervention fatalities has resulted in numerous
recommendations from policing organizations, policy-
makers, federal and state agencies, researchers, and
concerned communities. One recommendation has been
to increase training in tactical disengagement and con-
ﬂict de-escalation.2,58 Recent reports have called for
restructuring police culture around the core principle
of sanctity of all human life, emphasizing the need to
“slow the situation down” or tactically disengage as an
alternative to the current model of “never back down,
move in and take charge.”2,58 Several police departments
around the U.S. are currently implementing training in
tactical disengagement, de-escalation, and preservation
of life, some modeled on programs in other countries like
the United Kingdom, that have successfully reduced their
use of force.2,19 Related approaches may include changes
to training or policy on use of less than lethal force
technologies, such as chemical sprays or conducted
energy devices, to control or incapacitate combative
individuals, with some evidence suggesting decreased
ofﬁcer and civilian injuries associated with agency
adoption of these tools.32,69–71 Further research is needed
to assess the effectiveness of these approaches in reducing
both civilian and LE injuries.
Many departments have also implemented training
programs to assist ofﬁcers in identifying and managing
situations involving acute mental health crises using de-
escalation and other tactics to reduce the risk for violence
and use of force.72,73 Crisis intervention teams and
mobile mental health units have been employed in some
jurisdictions to improve police response by involving
mental health professionals or specially trained police
ofﬁcers at the scene.39,73 In addition to crisis response,
these teams can engage at-risk community members to
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provide support, connection to services, and prevent
future incidents and escalation.74–76 These approaches
have demonstrated some evidence of success in reducing
arrest rates in this population and may also decrease the
risk for violent escalation in some encounters.76,77
Several recommendations have also been offered
to counteract serious concerns about racial bias in
policing, including recruiting and hiring a diverse
workforce 69,78,79; implementation of an evidence-based
training curriculum to help ofﬁcers understand and
counteract potential bias 78–80; supervision focused on
eliminating discriminatory behavior 78; and community
policing strategies to increase positive interactions
between police and community members and build trust
(rather than restricting police contact to conﬂict-oriented
interactions).69,79,81
Re-establishing or reinforcing trust between LE and
many communities was identiﬁed as a core focus of the
2015 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.69
Recommendations centered around approaches to
improve procedural justice by acknowledging past injus-
tices, increasing transparency and accountability, proac-
tively engaging communities in positive interactions, and
increasing workforce diversity.69 Public distrust of LE in
the wake of legal intervention deaths is also fueled by the
infrequency with which ofﬁcers are sanctioned for
wrongful action: A recent study found that among
thousands of cases of fatal shootings by LE over the past
decade, only 54 ofﬁcers were charged and most were
cleared or acquitted.82 Policies mandating independent
investigation and prosecution have been recommended
to increase transparency and trust in these
investigations.69
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, NVDRS is not
nationally representative; information is only available
for the 17 states funded at the time. Second, NVDRS
represents only mortality data; information about non-
fatal injuries resulting from LE encounters is not
included. It is unknown whether included incidents
differ from LE encounters involving non-lethal or no
force. Third, NVDRS relies solely on investigative infor-
mation available from medical examiner and LE reports.
These cases are unique because ofﬁcers both inﬂict the
fatal violence and are the key (and sometimes only)
witnesses. The potential impact of this on investigative
reports is unclear (e.g., difﬁculties validating the infor-
mation, redaction of information because of legal con-
cerns). These concerns are mitigated somewhat by
inclusion of independent medical examiner reports that
can provide information that either supports or
contradicts LE accounts (e.g., autopsies suggesting evi-
dence of excessive force). Review of narrative informa-
tion revealed some instances in which ofﬁcers were
portrayed as legally culpable, but these instances were
few and may not fully represent the number of unlawful
LE actions in the sample. Fourth, information about
ofﬁcer characteristics is limited. Substantial missing data
were noted even for basic demographics, perhaps because
this information is considered less relevant to investi-
gators than in a typical homicide where information is
provided on suspected perpetrators. The reasons for the
extent of missing data and the implications for potential
bias are unclear. Reasons for police initial contact were
only coded here for a subset of cases to examine the
circumstances of those with “other” or no precipitating
crimes; future research examining reasons for initial
police contact in these cases could be informative. Addi-
tional information about the characteristics of ofﬁcers
involved, such as years of experience, previous perpetra-
tion of violence, or mental health—which could suggest
potential risk factors—is not available in this data set.
However, recent research highlights the need to examine
such factors—using other data sources—to understand
differential ofﬁcer response and risk. Ridgeway83 com-
pared shooting and non-shooting ofﬁcers at the same
scene (using data from 106 ofﬁcer-involved shootings in
New York City) and found that black ofﬁcers and those
with rapidly accumulating negative marks in their ﬁles
were more likely to shoot, whereas ofﬁcers who started
their policing careers later in life were less likely to shoot.
Additional research in other jurisdictions is needed to
better understand variations in ofﬁcer response and
identify hiring, management, or training policies that
might reduce shooting risk. Finally, the current study
utilizes data from 2009 to 2012 from 17 states; the
ﬁndings may not represent the patterns or circumstances
of deaths in more-recent years or nationally.
Conclusions
This study is one of the ﬁrst to examine the nature and
circumstances of deaths due to the use of lethal force by
LE in the U.S. using data from a multistate public health
surveillance system. Findings reinforce concerns about
racial/ethnic inequities in these cases and identify inci-
dent characteristics and scenarios with important impli-
cations for prevention. Future analyses should further
examine the possibility of statistically distinct subtypes of
legal intervention cases, compare mortality data with
nonfatal injuries, and examine the sequence of events
within the incident in more detail (e.g., how many began
with a trafﬁc stop or other routine event and then
escalated versus police contact initiated directly because
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of a more serious index event). Further research is also
needed to examine the effectiveness of training programs
and policy initiatives aimed at reducing the use of lethal
force while maintaining the health and safety of ofﬁcers
and communities.
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